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party counterclaim against the Ashmans placed the Ashrnans' maritime tort claim within 
the court's jurisdiction as a compulsory counterclaim because the claim arose under the 
same occurrence or transaction. Therefore, overall the court affirmed the holding of the 
District Court. 
Tara Beglin 
Class of 2005 
EXCULPATORY CLAUSE ABSOLVING PARTY 
FROM ITS OWN NEGL IGENCE H ELD VALID 
An exculpatory agreement that shifted the risk of loss to the boat owner and 
released the Yacht Club from all liability, including that liability arising from its 
own negligence will be held valid where the terms of the agreement are clearly and 
uneq uivocally defined. 
Sander v. Alexander Richardson Invs. 
United States Court of Appeals For The Eighth Circui t  
334 F .3d 7 1 2  
(Decided J uly 1 ,  2003) 
Appelles filed a negligence claim against the appellant, the Yacht Club of St. 
Louis ("Yacht Club") after i ts boats was destroyed in a fire at the club. The Yacht Club 
argued that the exculpatory clause in the boat owners' slip rental agreement released it  
from liability even if it  was due to the Yacht Club's own negligence. The United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri granted recovery to the boat owners. 
On Appeal the United States Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit reversed. 
Ronald and Martha Jessup owned a houseboat that was kept at the Yacht Club 
marina. Mr. Jessup noticed a fuel leak near the engine fuel pump and requested the 
Yacht Club to assist him in the repairs. The Yacht Club then referred Mr. Jessup to Mr. 
Shulte a maintenance worker for the Yacht Club who i nstalled a new fuel pump. Three 
days later Mr. Jessup started the engine; shortly after he heard an explosion and watched 
as flames engulfed the hatch area where the engines were located. F ire engulfed the boat 
and then spread to other docks in the marina destroying the appelle's boats. 
Following the fire, the Jessups brought an action for declaratory j udgment in 
district court seeking to exonerate or limit their liability for all claims arising from the 
incident. Each of the boat owners filed claims against both Jessups and the Yacht Club, 
while the Yacht Club and the Jessups filed claims against each other. The claims against 
the Yacht Club were based on the theory that Mr. Shutle negligently installed the fuel 
pump which caused the fire, and that the Yacht Club was liable for assuring that Mr. 
Shulte was quali fi ed to perfonn the repair, when in fact he was not. 
The Yacht Club defended against the boat owners by asserting that an exculpatory 
clause printed on the back of each boat owner's slip agreement exonerated it from any 
liability for damages caused by the fire. 
In reversing the district cou11's decision, the Court of Appeals discussed four 
main issues ( I )  whether the exculpatory clause is valid, (2) whether the exculpatory 
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clause was clear, (3) whether the exculpatory clause contravenes public policy, and (4) 
whether the Yacht Club had stronger bargaining power when it made the contract. 
In reviewing the agreement the Court noted that maritime law contracts are 
construed by giving terms their normal everyday meaning and the terms clearly shifted 
the risk of loss to the boat owners, so the Court held that the Yacht Club was released 
from any liability. The exculpatory clause printed on the back of each boat owner's slip 
agreement stated that all tenants must agree to keep their vessels fully insured, and that 
the landlord does not carry insurance on the property and will not be responsible for any 
injuries or property damage, and furthermore, the clause stated that the tenant releases 
and discharges the landlord from any and all liability for loss, injury, or damages to 
person or property sustained while in or on the facilities of landlord, including fire. 
Sander v. Alexander Richardson Invs. , 334 F.3d 7 1 2, 7 1 4  (8th Cir. 2003). 
Currently there is a split in Federal Circuit Court jurisprudence questioning 
whether an exculpatory clause fully absolving a party from liability on account of its own 
negligence is enforceable. The Eleventh Circuit stated that there must be a deterrent to 
negligence and a repairer must not be absolved of all liability Diesel "Repower. " Inc. v. 
Islander Invs. Ltd. , 27 1 F.3d 1 3 1 8, 1 324 ( 1 1 th Cir. 2001 ). However, the Fifth and Ninth 
Circuits agree that exculpatory clauses are enforceable even when they completely 
absolve parties from liability. Theriot v. Bay Drilling Corp . .  783 F.2d 527, 540 (5th Cir. 
1 986); Royal Ins. Co. of Am. v. S. W Marine, 1 94 F.3d 1 009, 1 0 1 4  (9th Cir. 1 999). In the 
present case the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held for the appellants, 
determining that the exculpatory clause was valid and unambiguous. Therefore, the Yacht 
Club is absolved of all liability. 
The court determined that two competing public policy doctrines were at odds 
with each other: holding parties responsible for their actions by limiting their ability to 
absolve themselves from liability due to their own negligence versus the liberty to 
contract. Sander v. Alexander Richardson Invs. , 334 F.3d at 7 1 6. The court concluded 
that the highest public policy is found in the enforcement of the contract that was actually 
fonned. Santa Fe, Prescott, & Phoenix Ry. Co. v. Grant Bros. Canst. Co. ,  228 U.S. 1 77, 
1 88 ( 1 9 1 3). 
In the past, exculpatory clauses were disfavored in admiralty courts; however 
today the clauses are enforced because parties have the ability to bargain items within a 
contract. The court further distinguished those cases that did not allow a release from 
negligence, stating those cases should be limited to towage contracts because of a desire 
to discourage negligence by making wrongdoers pay damages; and to protect those in 
need of goods or services from being pressured by others who have power to drive hard 
bargains. Sander v. Alexander Richardson Invs. , 334 F.3d at 7 1 7. In the present case the 
Court concluded that "within admiralty law, the doctrine prohibiting a party from 
completely absolving itself from liability for its own negligence is limited to 
circumstances involving relationships similar to towage agreements, such as bailment, 
employment, or public service relationship." Sander v. Alexander Richardson Invs. , 334 
F.3d at 7 1 9. 
Furthermore, the court held that an "exculpatory clause that absolves a marina 
from liability for its own negligence is enforceable as long as the parties intent to do so is 
clear and the clause is not the result of overreaching." !d. The court found that the clause 
was clear and the intent of the agreement was to shift the liability onto the boat owners. 
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The appellees had the power to bargain with the appellant in order to shift the liability 
onto the appellant but failed to do so. The evidence further showed there were several 
other marinas in the area and that the Yacht Club negotiated some terms with other 
members of club. However, appellees concede that they did not attempt to negotiate any 
of the terms of the agreement. Therefore, the appellees failed to establish that the 
exculpatory clause was a result of overreaching. 
In sum, the Eighth Circuit concluded the exculpatory clause was unambiguous, 
valid, and enforceable. Moreover, public policy demands enforcing contracts as written 
and recognizing a parties' freedom to enter into contracts. !d. at 72 1 .  
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